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Tweet to Defeat Government
Bribes: Limiting Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act to Combat
Global Corporate Corruption
ABSTRACT
Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
in the 1970s to address the rampant bribery of foreign officials by
US companies. Because that resulted in a competitive
disadvantage to US companies in the global corporate
community, Congress amended the Act to add § 78dd-3, which
extended the FCPA's jurisdiction to foreign entities and
individuals whose alleged offenses had occurred within the
United States. This led to a vast overall increase in enforcement
matters, but foreign entities and individuals have been impacted
the most, even if their actions have had virtually no connection to
the United States. Not only have current enforcement patterns
risked the reputation of the United States by infringing on other
states' sovereignty, but they have also resulted in increased costs
to US agencies. This Note addresses these issues by discussing the
historical evolution of the FCPA and potential future enforcement
patterns by the Trump administration. It then rejects the recent
enforcement patterns and advises President Trump-as well as
future administrations-to adopt more strategic enforcement
practices. Specifically, it argues that the Trump administration
should read § 78dd-3 literally and ban FCPA matters against
foreign entities and individuals whose actions have virtually no
connection to the United States. It also argues that President
Trump and his senior officials at the State Department should
engage in public diplomacy to tackle global corporate corruption.
Finally, it suggests that President Trump invoke the OECD
Convention to aid his public diplomacy campaign.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Enacted in 1977, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA or the
Act) was a laudable effort by Congress to tackle the epidemic of
corporate greed in the international realm. Having recently dealt with
extensive political corruption, the United States sought to regain its
international prestige by criminalizing the corporate bribes of foreign
officials.' However, prosecuting US corporations and individuals while
failing to account for foreign corporations and individuals resulted in a
competitive disadvantage for US companies operating in the global
market.2 To resolve this issue, Congress amended the Act to extend
jurisdiction to foreign corporations and individuals.3 Consequently, US
agencies were statutorily authorized to enforce the FCPA against
entities and individuals who were not citizens of the United States.4
This amendment has led to an increase in the prosecution of
companies and individuals-both foreign and domestic-under the Act
over the last decade.5 But the Act also leaves the United States
vulnerable to criticism from the international community.6
1. See Ezekiel K. Rediker, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Judicial Review,
Jurisdiction, and the "Culture of Settlement", 40 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 53, 57 (2015)
(stating that Congress enacted the FCPA in direct response to the Watergate Scandal,
where U.S.-based multinational corporations created slush funds to make illicit
payments to government officials, including President Nixon's campaign).
2. Id. at 60.
3. Barr Benyamin et al., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1333, 1335 (2016).
4. Id. at 1335-36.
5. See Annalisa Leibold, Extraterritorial Application of the FCPA Under
International Law, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 225, 233 (2015) (noting that for twenty-two
years "there were on average 3 FCPA matters per year compared to yearly investigation
totals of around 100" in recent years).
6. See Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred
Prosecution Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
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Specifically, the Act's broad language allows government agencies to
bring charges against foreign entities and individuals whose illegal
conduct has virtually no connection to the United States.
7 This practice
is bolstered by the fact that few individuals or corporations have
challenged the Act's broad language, so little judicial precedent limits
the agencies' authority.8 While this increase in enforcement ostensibly
promotes the original purpose of the Act, the exercise of broad
jurisdiction over foreign entities and nationals is not worth the risk to
the international reputation of the United States, nor is it guaranteed
to eradicate further corporate corruption. With a new administration
in the White House as of last year, US agencies may now have an
opportunity to change the direction of this enforcement.
This Note addresses the tension between the broad enforcement
of the FCPA against foreign companies and individuals and the need
to respect international norms of sovereignty. Part II outlines the
background and context of the FCPA. Specifically, Part II details the
origins of the FCPA, describes the Act's evolution over the past few
decades, and assesses potential patterns of enforcement based on the
Trump administration's current enforcement actions and its members'
opinions of the law. Part III discusses the purpose and framework of
the FCPA and explains how US agencies are able to exercise
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and individuals whose illegal
actions take place almost entirely outside of the United States. It
subsequently addresses the issues implicated by broad enforcement
against those entities, including potential harms to the United States'
reputation and its economy. Finally, Part IV rejects the US Securities
and Exchange Commission's (SEC) and Department of Justice's (DOJ)
recent FCPA enforcement practices and recommends those agencies
limit one provision's jurisdiction over foreign entities and individuals
to those who are physically within the United States. Furthermore,
this Note suggests that the United States use its diplomatic channels,
such as the State Department or influence in global organizations, to
encourage other countries to enforce their own anti-corruption
legislation to further eliminate international corporate corruption.
REV. 497, 525 (2015) (listing several concerns about the FCPA that were articulated by
an international organization).
7. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 255 (stating that the FCPA's language concerning
jurisdiction is unclear and agencies thereby enforce the Act as broadly as possible).
8. Id. at 239.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Congress enacted the FCPA in direct response to the increased
interest in political and corporate corruption during the 1970s. Still
reeling from the public backlash against Watergate and Vietnam, the
Carter administration was determined to restore the pristine image of
the United States in the international arena.9 To do this, federal
officials began probing into unusual payments by US corporations to
foreign officials, as the US government feared that these exchanges
were threatening the country's reputation abroad.'0
One investigation demonstrated that the Nixon administration
had personally benefitted from bribes of officials-both foreign and
domestic-with money that was pooled together by US multinational
corporations." At the same time, Congress held multiple hearings in
which it discovered that the practice of bribing foreign officials was
common among members of corporate America.12 These investigations
culminated in an SEC report that detailed the rampant bribery of
foreign officials by US corporations in exchange for business
opportunities in their countries.'3 After determining that no US law
prohibited US corporations from bribing foreign officials, Congress
enacted the FCPA to combat this issue in 1977 with overwhelming
public support.14
When it was enacted, the FCPA granted the DOJ and the SEC the
ability to bring civil and criminal charges against corporate entities
and their officers for bribing foreign officials in exchange for business
opportunities.15 It was revolutionary for its time, as the United States
was the only country that criminalized this type of behavior.16 Initially,
the FCPA prohibited only US corporations and individuals from
bribing foreign officials.' 7 Specifically, its two main anti-bribery
provisions barred "issuers" and "domestic concerns" from bribing
9. Rediker, supra note 1, at 57.
10. Mike Koehler, FCPA 101: When and Why Was the FCPA Enacted?, FCPA
PROFESSOR, http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/4RYP-CAMD] (archived Oct. 8, 2016).
11. Rediker, supra note 1, at 57.
12. Koehler, supra note 10.
13. See Lauren Ann Ross, Using Foreign Relations Law to Limit Extraterritorial
Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 DUKE L. J. 445, 452 (2012) (referring
to the Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal
Corporate Payments and Practices which detailed earlier accounts of bribery by U.S.-
based companies).
14. Koehler, supra note 10.
15. See Taylor J. Phillips, The Federal Common Law of Successor Liability and
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 89, 92 (2015) (noting the
SEC's authority over civil cases and the DOJ's authority over criminal and civil cases).
16. Rediker, supra note 1, at 58.
17. Id. at 60.
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foreign officials.1 8 "Issuers" are defined as corporations that trade on a
US stock exchange, and "domestic concerns" are defined to comprise
American citizens and corporations that originated under US laws.
1 9
Although these definitions could include foreign individuals and
corporations as well, Congress and other US officials expressly limited
the FCPA's jurisdiction to those residing within the United States.
2 0
Congress limited the FCPA's jurisdiction to US entities and
individuals because it assumed foreign countries would enact and
implement their own anti-corruption statutes.
2 ' However, foreign
countries failed to follow suit, which resulted in US corporations falling
to a competitive disadvantage compared with their foreign
counterparts.22 Because companies routinely secured government
contracts through bribes to foreign officials, the threat of criminal and
civil liability limited US corporations' ability to pursue those contracts
compared with foreign entities that faced no such issues.
23
Consequently, public dismay over this inequity compelled Congress to
expand the Act's jurisdiction to foreign entities and individuals.
24
B. 1998 Amendments: Extension of Jurisdiction to Foreign
Corporations and Nationals
To ensure other countries would enact anti-bribery laws that
corresponded with the standards set by the FCPA, the US government
participated in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions (the OECD
Convention) in 1997.25 During that convention, thirty-four member
18. Id. at 58.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 58-59 ("Congress specifically refrained from asserting jurisdiction
over non-U.S. individuals and companies."); Emily Willborn, Extraterritorial
Enforcement and Prosecutorial Discretion in the FCPA: A Call for International
Prosecutorial Factors, 22 MINN. J. INT'L L. 422, 425 (2013) ("Tresident Carter's signing
statement indicated that the United States had no intention of enforcing the Act against
corporations headquartered abroad.").
21. See Rediker, supra note 1, at 60 ('The initial purpose of the FCPA was to
police only the illicit conduct of American businesses. There was nonetheless an
expectation held by Congress and in policy circles that other nations would pass similar
legislation in the wake of the FCPA.").
22. Id.; Natasha N. Wilson, Pushing the Limits of Jurisdiction over Foreign
Actors under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1063, 1065-66
(2014).
23. Kayla Feld, Controlling the Prosecution of Bribery: Applying Corporate Law
Principles to Define a "Foreign Official" in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 88 WASH.
L. REV. 245, 256 (2013); see Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act As A
Threat to Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419, 421 n.12 (1999) (citing an interview
where U.S. distributor's business was impeded due to the FCPA's strict anti-bribery
enforcement).
24. Rediker, supra note 1, at 63.
25. Id. at 62; Leibold, supra note 5, at 232.
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states of the OECD signed a treaty in which they agreed to enact new
or modify existing anti-bribery legislation within their own countries
so that their laws would more closely mirror the FCPA's stringent anti-
corruption provisions.26 Every member state increased its commitment
to combating foreign corruption, even though each differed in the kind
of legislation it propagated under the treaty.27 The OECD Convention's
call to reduce foreign corruption inspired the enactment of current,
powerful anti-bribery legislation, such as the UK Bribery Act.28
The treaty also stated that any jurisdiction governed by these
pieces of legislation should be interpreted broadly so that no physical
connection to the prosecuting country shall be required.29 Accordingly,
for the United States, this treaty served the dual purposes of
criminalizing foreign bribery on an international scale as well as
ensuring that US corporations were ostensibly on the same legal
playing field as their competitors.3 0 Emboldened by its success at the
OECD Convention, the United States tried to further accomplish these
goals by clearly extending the FCPA's jurisdiction to non-US
corporations and individuals through a 1998 amendment o the Act.3 1
The 1998 amendment added a new provision, § 78dd-3, to the Act,
which extended jurisdiction to foreign nationals through the concept of
territorial jurisdiction.32 Section 78dd-3 prohibits any person from
using mail or interstate commerce in the United States in furtherance
of any act that constitutes bribery of a foreign official.3 3 The Act's plain
meaning and legislative history make it clear that individuals who
have committed this offense "while in the territory of the United
States" are liable regardless of whether they are foreign born.34
However, in practice, the DOJ and SEC have interpreted this provision
to extend a broad reach over foreign corporations whose offenses have
virtually no connection to the United States.3 5
26. Leibold, supra note 5, at 232; see Feld, supra note 23, at 256 (noting that the
OECD's overall goal was to "level the playing field" among global corporate competitors).
27. Willborn, supra note 20, at 430.
28. See id. at 431-32 (stating that the FCPA and UK Bribery Act are similar,
except that the latter has a strict liability standard and includes a compliance defense).
29. Rediker, supra note 1, at 62.
30. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 232 (referencing U.S. attempts "to build an
international consensus for anti-corruption . . . because it was believed that the FCPA
placed U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage" and OECD mandates that helped
achieve these goals).
31. See Willborn, supra note 20, at 426 (stating that Congress ratified the
extraterritorial amendment due to the OECD's declaration that anti-bribery legislation
could be enforced against actions that had little connection to the prosecuting country).
32. Leibold, supra note 5, at 228.
33. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2012)).
34. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2012)).
35. See Wilson, supra note 22, at 1063-64 (listing instances where foreign
corporations have been prosecuted when their actions have no connection to the United
States, such as when a corporation's bribes have merely used the U.S. banking system
as an intermediary for a wire transfer).
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C. Increase in Overall Enforcement Matters under the FCPA from
1998 to Today
The DOJ and SEC have drastically increased criminal and civil
enforcement matters under the FCPA since the start of the new
millennium.3 6 From the Act's inception in 1977 to 2004, these agencies
combined pursued on average fewer than four actions every year.
3 7
However, as of 2013, each agency had somewhere around seventy to
eighty matters that it was investigating.3 8 Indeed, over the past few
years, officials at the DOJ and SEC have pursued high profile cases
with large corporations that have yielded the largest settlements in.
FCPA history.39 This overall increase in enforcement is directly
attributable to the expanded jurisdiction under the 1998
amendments.40
The financial collapse of Enron and ensuing litigation in the early
2000s also contributed to the dramatic increase in active FCPA
matters.41 There, Enron's auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, was charged
and ultimately convicted of obstruction of justice after its officers
destroyed numerous documents related to the primary investigation of
the Enron Scandal.4 2 Not only did the conviction impact Arthur
Anderson as a corporation and its executives for engaging in criminal
behavior, but it also resulted in the demise of the business.
43
Consequently, several hundred Arthur Andersen employees lost their
jobs and were negatively impacted by the harsh sanctions, even if they
had nothing to do with the criminal behavior.4
4 In response to the
devastating effect the prosecution had on Arthur Andersen's business
and employees, the DOJ released the Thompson Memorandum in
which the agency encouraged the pursuit of "alternative resolution
vehicles" as opposed to trials against corporations and their executives
who have committed crimes.45 As a result, in 2004 the DOJ started
36. Id. at 1068; Phillips, supra note 15, at 95.
37. Willborn, supra note 20, at 428; Wilson, supra note 22, at 1068.
38. Willborn, supra note 20, at 428.
39. Id.; see Jon Jordan, The Need for A Comprehensive International Foreign
Bribery Compliance Program, Covering A to Z, in an Expanding Global Anti-Bribery
Environment, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 89, 105-06 (2012) (detailing some of the high-profile
investigations brought by both agencies, many of which resulted in the highest
settlements on record).
40. See Evan P. Lestelle, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, International
Norms of Foreign Public Bribery, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 83 TUL. L. REV. 527,
535-36 (2008) ("The 1998 amendments to the FCPA, which expanded coverage to
persons acting 'while in the United States' regardless of nationality or allegiance,
provided another source for expansive enforcement.").
41. See Koehler, supra note 6, at 501 (describing the impact Enron had on the
rise of NPAs and DPAs which coincided with the rise of enforcement).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 501-02.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 503.
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negotiating non-prosecution agreements (NPA) and deferred
prosecution agreements (DPA) instead of prosecuting companies for
corporate crimes.46
NPAs and DPAs remain the most popular form of dispute
resolution under the FCPA because they allow corporations that are
under investigation to avoid costly litigation by paying a civil fine,
disgorging profits, and/or instituting FCPA compliance programs,
among other mitigating tactics.4 7 These alternative resolution vehicles
are privately negotiated between the government and corporations and
are rarely subject to judicial review.48 Moreover, corporations would
rather pay a fine than challenge jurisdiction and suffer the costs that
accompany extensive investigations and trials.49 Consequently, federal
officials have nearly unlimited discretion in determining which
corporations and individuals are within the FCPA's jurisdiction and
have subsequently pursued charges at an increasing rate over the last
several years.50 Experts predict that the DOJ and SEC will continue
this practice until more courts address cases concerning jurisdiction.5 1
Most interestingly, although the majority of enforcement actions
are brought against US domestic corporations, some of the largest
settlements have stemmed from cases involving foreign companies.52
Foreign corporations have paid seven of the ten highest FCPA
settlements to date, with the highest, USD 965 million, paid in 2017
by a Swedish corporation.53 Because many of these enforcement
actions were based on tenuous connections to the United States, they
46. Id.
47. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 239 (noting that NPAs and DPAs were used for
77 percent of FCPA-related actions between 2004 and 2011).
48. Id. at 239.
49. See id. at 240 (stating that entering NPAs or DPAs "is generally the only
viable option" for corporations); Koehler, supra note 6, at 554-55 (commenting that
agencies can pressure companies in NPAs and DPAs with the threat of "government
suspension and debarment; the loss of key licenses, such as banking licenses; the drain
on the time and energy of corporate executives and other witnesses; legal costs; and costs
associated with the uncertainty of a criminal investigation and potential indictment"). It
is worth noting, however, that prosecutors frequently use these tactics to pressure
defendants to plead guilty. Sarah Ribstein, A Question of Costs: Considering Pressure on
White Collar Criminal Defendants, 58 DUKE L. J. 857, 860 (2009).
50. Leibold, supra note 5, at 240.
51. See Sean Hecker & Margot Laporte, Should FCPA "Territorial" Jurisdiction
Reach Extraterritorial Proportions?, 42 ABA INT'L L. NEWS 1 (2013) (stating that courts
must hear more challenges to the FCPA's broad jurisdiction for the DOJ and SEC to
discontinue their expansive enforcement).
52. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 236 (noting that even though 30 percent of
FCPA matters are brought against foreign companies, 67 percent of the fines are paid
by those entities).
53. Richard L. Cassin, Telia Tops Our New Top Ten List (After We Do Some
Math), FCPA BLOG (Sept. 22, 2017, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/
2 017/9/2 2/telia-tops-our-new-top-ten-list-after-we-do-some-math. html
[https://perma.cclE9K9-D6XE] (archived Oct. 9, 2017).
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could spark controversy in the international community due to
potential violations of norms of sovereignty.
54
D. Future Enforcement under the Trump Administration
The Obama administration not only adhered to these patterns of
enforcement, but also expanded them. Under President Obama's
purview, the SEC developed and instituted the FCPA Unit within the
Division of Enforcement that focused exclusively on FCPA matters.
55
The SEC created this unit to ensure some of its attorneys developed an
expertise in investigating FCPA matters and to coordinate with the
DOJ so that enforcement was consistent across agencies.
56 With the
help of this unit, the DOJ and SEC executed 325 NPAs and DPAs
during President Obama's term.57 Compared to the 130 agreements
executed by the previous administration,58 the sheer number of NPAs
and DPAs under Obama's agencies demonstrated the administration's
staunch interest in prioritizing the enforcement of FCPA matters.
Future enforcement patterns of the FCPA, however, are
unpredictable due to today's political climate. Last year, the United
States experienced a shift of power in the Executive Branch as
President Donald Trump took control of the White House.
59 Although
President Trump has not officially commented on how or if he will
enforce the Act since assuming office,60 he has criticized the FCPA in
the past, calling it a "horrible law" and finding "it 'ridiculous' that the
United States would criminalize bribes that occur abroad."
6 1 In
54. See Lestelle, supra note 40, at 536 (suggesting that the DOJ and SEC's
interpretation of § 78dd-3 as granting jurisdiction over behavior that has an effect on the
United States may be inappropriate).
55. CRIM. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & ENF'T Div., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE US FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 5 (2012).
56. Id.
57. James R. Copland & Rafael A. Mangual, The Shadow Regulatory State at
the Crossroads: Federal Deferred Prosecution Agreements Face an Uncertain Future,
MANHATTAN INST., June 2017, at 6.
58. Id.
59. Karen Tumulty et al., Donald Trump Wins the Presidency in Stunning Upset




BG8S] (archived Jan. 7, 2018).
60. See Jeremy Berke, After Trump Took Office, He Told Tillerson that
American Businesses Were Being Unfairly Penalized by Laws Prohibiting Them from
Bribing Foreign Officials, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 6, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.coml
trump-tillersonamerican-businesses-bribing-foreign-officials-
2 0 17-10 [https://perma.cc/
67VK-WRHE] (archived Oct. 9, 2017) (reporting that the President had privately told
his Secretary of State he disapproved of the effects of the FCPA without mentioning any
public comment on the issue).
61. Adam Davidson, Donald Trump's Worst Deal, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 13,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/13/donald-trumps-worst-deal
[https://perma.cclR39X-USDE] (archived Feb. 2, 2018); Roderick Thomas & Colin
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explaining his reasoning, President Trump stated that "[e]very other
country goes into these places and they do what they have to do" and
that if US companies do not engage in this behavior-namely paying
bribes to foreign officials-"[they'll] do business nowhere."62
Furthermore, sources indicate that President Trump's company itself
may be entangled in potential FCPA actions.6 3 Most recently,
President Trump was linked to a corrupt real estate development
project in Azerbaijan to which the Trump Organization at a minimum
licensed its name.64 Combined with President Trump's past criticisms,
this involvement in a potentially corrupt project may presage an
overall decrease in enforcement of the FCPA.
By contrast, President Trump's appointments to head the DOJ
and SEC have acknowledged the Act has some merit, which has left
experts to speculate as to how it may be enforced in the future.65 For
instance, President Trump's pick for Chairman of the SEC, Jay
Clayton, previously spoke about his desire to reform FCPA
enforcement practices.66 As the Chair of the New York City Bar
Committee on International Business Transactions (NYC Bar
Committee), Clayton helped draft and review a paper criticizing the
overzealous enforcement of FCPA matters by the DOJ and SEC in
recent years.6 7 In this paper, the NYC Bar Committee claimed that
these enforcement practices were detrimental to US corporate
interests.68 More specifically, it stated that heavy US enforcement
imposed greater civil and criminal penalties on corporations that were
subject to the FCPA, including US companies and foreign entities
trading on the US stock exchange, rendering them less competitive
with companies that were free from these regulations.69 As a result,
Cloherty, FCPA Expectations Under Trump, LAW360 (Jan. 24, 2017, 1:09 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/883641/fcpa-expectations-under-president-trump
[https://perma.ccl9F3K-B5GT] (archived Mar. 2, 2017).
62. Davidson, supra note 61.
63. See id. (reporting on a potential FCPA violation in Azerbaijan in which the
Trump Organization was allegedly involved).
64. See id. (noting that the Trump Organization abandoned the deal shortly
after the election in December 2016).
65. Richard Levick, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act at 40: No Shortage of
Challenges, FORBES (May 16, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2017/05/
16/the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-at-40-no-shortage-of-challenges/#2239bac35f9O
[https://perma.cc/45MX-47YV| (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
66. See Andrew Ramonas, Trump's SEC Pick: FCPA Causes 'Lasting Harm'for
US Companies, BLOOMBERG BNA: BIG L. Bus. (Jan. 9, 2017),
https://bol.bna.com/trumps-sec-pick-fcpa-causes-lasting-harm-for-u-s-companies/
[https://perma.cc/96KX-8L8F] (archived Jan. 18, 2017) (referencing a critique of FCPA
enforcement patterns penned by Jay Clayton in 2011).
67. Id.
68. See COMM. ON INT'L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, N.Y.C. BAR ASS'N, THE FCPA AND
ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 19 (2011) (describing how
compliance with the FCPA under recent enforcement patterns is costly to US
corporations).
69. Id. at 21.
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US companies were disproportionately punished compared to their
foreign competitors.70
The NYC Bar Committee posited several potential solutions that
could reduce the costs of active US enforcement while maintaining a
strong commitment to anti-bribery norms, but it failed to reach a
conclusion.7 1 Although the NYC Bar Committee called for an open-
ended assessment of the issue, it ultimately left the impression that
the SEC should reduce enforcement to mitigate its costs.
7 2 Since
assuming office, however, Clayton has changed his views, stating that
"the FCPA can be a powerful and effective means" to reduce
corruption.73
Similarly, Attorney General Jeff Sessions previously criticized
FCPA enforcement patterns but has vowed to enforce the Act since
assuming office. During a 2010 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing,
he expressed skepticism about the proliferation of NPAs and DPAs in
recent years.74 At that hearing, Sessions questioned the arbitrary
strategy of pursuing FCPA alternative resolution vehicles in large
quantities when prosecutors could instead charge companies who have
clearly committed a crime.75 Since assuming office, however, Sessions
has made strides to assure the public that the FCPA will still be
vigorously enforced. In a speech to the Ethics and Compliance
Initiative, Sessions publicly declared that the DOJ "will continue to
enforce the [FCPA]," reasoning that "[c]ompanies should succeed
because they provide superior products and services, not because they
pay off the right people."
76
70. Id.
71. Id. at 24.
72. See id. ("Alternatively, the United States could take steps to reduce the
regulatory costs for firms currently subject to the FCPA without undermining any of the
Act's fundamental objectives. For example, the US could decide to (1) dial back the scope
of FCPA enforcement with respect to companies and focus more on individuals engaged
in foreign corruption, (2) encourage other countries to do the same and (3) agree with
other countries to cooperate on international matters such as information sharing,
investigations, and extradition.").
73. Steven M. Witzel & Arthur Kutoroff, FCPA Standstill, N.Y. L. J. (Sept. 6,
2017), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202797372471/FCPA-Standstill?slret
urn=20170910001311 [https://perma.cclL9ZD-AJS9] (archived Oct. 9, 2017).
74. See Mike Koehler, Attorney General Nominee Jeff Sessions - "I was taught if
they violated a law, you charge them. If they didn't violate the law, you don't charge
them.", FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 21, 2016), http://fcpaprofessor.com/attorney-general-
nominee-jeff-sessions-taught-violated-law-charge-didnt-violate-law- dont-charge/
[http://perma.cc/767X-5B42] (archived Jan. 18, 2017) (featuring portions of the hearing
transcript).
75. See id. ("Normally, I was taught if they violated a law, you charge them. If
they didn't violate the law, you don't charge them.").
76. Charlie Savage, Sessions Vows to Enforce an Anti-Bribery Law Trump
Ridiculed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/
2 4 /
us/politics/jeff-sessions-anti-bribery.html [https://perma.cc/EJ3M-4VXB] (archived Oct.
9, 2017).
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Notwithstanding Clayton's and Sessions's assertions that they
will continue enforcing the Act, departments under President Trump
have so far ostensibly de-emphasized enforcement of the FCPA,
launching only three actions by September 2017, compared with
President Obama's twenty-five matters in his first nine months.7 7
Furthermore, the DOJ has dismissed numerous prior investigations
that were opened during the Obama administration without imposing
any penalties on the companies involved.7 8 Given the available
information, enforcement patterns could either decrease, as one would
imagine is President Trump's preference, or they could continue as
they have over the past decade, as Clayton and Sessions have
suggested. These conflicting views and the administration's
indecipherable pattern of enforcement to date have left experts unsure
about how and if the administration will continue to enforce the FCPA
during the administration's tenure.7 9
III. ANALYSIS
A. Purpose and Framework of the FCPA
Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 to minimize corporate
corruption by prohibiting the bribery of foreign officers in exchange for
advantageous business opportunities.80 The law is enforced by SEC
and DOJ officers who pursue cases within their own spheres of
authority.8 1 With jurisdiction over corporations that trade on a US
stock exchange, the SEC has the power to bring civil charges against
"issuers" of securities and their "officers, directors, employees, and
agents."82 Conversely, the DOJ has the ability to bring civil and
criminal charges against "non-issuers" and their affiliated
individuals.8 3
The FCPA has two major provisions with which certain
individuals and entities must comply. The first provision requires
companies that trade on a US stock exchange to meet certain
accounting standards, including the maintenance of books and internal
records.84 The second provision prohibits "issuers," "domestic
77. Witzel & Kutoroff, supra note 73.
78. Id.
79. Levick, supra note 65.
80. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 2-3 (1998) (stating that the Act's purpose is "to
prevent the use of corporate funds for corrupt purposes").
81. Phillips, supra note 15, at 92.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:An Overview, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act (last
updated Feb. 3, 2017) [https://perma.ccl8LL4-XTDC] (archived Nov. 12, 2016).
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concerns," or "any other persons" from bribing any foreign official in
exchange for a business opportunity in the foreign official's country.
8 5
This subpart focuses on the extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised
under the latter provision.
To launch a successful cause of action under the anti-bribery
provision, a prosecutor must prove the following elements: (1) the
action was committed by "an issuer, domestic concern, or any other
person"; (2) who used "the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce"; (3) "corruptly"; (4) "to offer, pay, or authorize the
payment of money or anything of value"; (5) "to any foreign official";
(6) "for the purpose of influencing any act or decision of any such
official"; (7) in order "to obtain, retain, or direct business to any
person."8 6 The Act also provides a number of exceptions and affirmative
defenses, some of which are discussed below.
87
The FCPA allows federal officials to exercise nationality,
territorial, and extraterritorial jurisdiction over individuals." Under
§§ 78dd-1 and 78dd-2 of the Act, the SEC and DOJ can exercise
nationality jurisdiction over US issuers and domestic concerns.
8 9 While
§ 78dd-1 addresses companies that have securities registered with US
stock exchanges, § 78dd-2 addresses individuals who are citizens,
nationals, or residents of the United States.
9 0 Both groups are liable if
they commit the acts that fall within the purview of the FCPA
regardless of whether the acts occur within US borders.
9 1
Alternatively, the SEC and DOJ can exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and individuals under § 78dd-3.9 2
In practice, agencies have interpreted this provision to allow the
prosecution of foreign entities and individuals when their offenses are
committed abroad but have a "sufficient nexus" to the United States.
9 3
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012).
86. Lestelle, supra note 40, at 531-32.
87. Infra Part III.B.
88. Mike Koehler, FCPA 101: Who Is Subject to the Anti-Bribery Provisions?,
FCPA PROFESSOR, http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2018)
[https://perma.ccl4RYP-CAMD] (archived Oct. 8, 2016).
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3.
90. Joel Androphy & Ashley Gargour, The Intersection of the Dodd-Frank Act
and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: What All Practitioners, Whistleblowers,
Defendants, and Corporations Need to Know, 45 TEX. J. BUS. L. 129, 133 (2013).
91. Id.
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3.
93. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 253-54 (describing a hypothetical example
where a foreign individual can be prosecuted when her foreign bribe is wired through a
U.S. bank even if her other actions occur entirely outside of the United States).
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B. Scope of Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and Individuals
under § 78dd-3 and Affirmative Defenses
To exercise their authority to prosecute foreign companies and
individuals with few connections to the United States, the SEC and
DOJ invoke § 78dd-3 of the FCPA. This provision specifically forbids
''any person other than an issuer . . . or a domestic concern" from
bribing foreign officials "while in the territory of the United States" by
means of mail or interstate commerce.94 Theoretically, the text of this
provision limits liability of foreign actors for offenses that have
occurred within US borders.9 5 Nonetheless, the SEC and DOJ
prosecute many actions that have mere tenuous connections to the
United States.96 Activities that are tangentially related to the United
States and in furtherance of the bribery of foreign officials, such as the
exchange of US dollars or a wire transfer that passes through a US
bank during the transaction, are enough to trigger jurisdiction under
the Act.97 Moreover, foreign corporations or citizens who are not
covered by the FCPA whatsoever, and thus are not subject to its
jurisdiction, can be criminally prosecuted for ancillary offenses.98 In
that case, a foreign individual acting in furtherance of an FCPA
violation committed by someone who is covered by the Act can be
prosecuted for his or her actions under US law notwithstanding his or
her tenuous connection to the United States.99 This creates issues for
foreign entities and individuals who utilize third-party agents as
liaisons to accomplish their business objectives.100
The FCPA does provide exceptions and affirmative defenses that
can be used to challenge the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Subsection (b) exempts any offers to foreign officials that are
specifically made to "expedite or to secure the performance of a routine
governmental action by [that] foreign official."1 01 This means that
mandatory payments to foreign bureaucrats to secure an existing
business opportunity are exempt. Of more interest to foreign
corporations or individuals, any person under investigation can assert
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
95. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 226 (stating that corporations whose
headquarters are outside of the United States and who do not issue securities on U.S.
stock markets are only subject to liability under § 78dd-3 on its face when their actions
are taken within U.S. borders).
96. See id. ("[I]n practice FCPA jurisdiction can be based on a mere tangential
connection (i.e. a bank wire transfer or an email) between the corruption and the United
States, even though such an extraterritorial action may not be permitted under
international law.") (emphasis added).
97. Id.; Wilson, supra note 22, at 1064.
98. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE FCPA AND
THE UK BRIBERY ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 3 (2012).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2012).
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an affirmative defense that his or her actions were exempt because
they were legal under "the written laws and regulations" of the country
in which the offense occurred.102 Despite this opportunity, foreign
entities and individuals face many challenges in asserting this defense
due to cultural and linguistic differences, which is discussed in further
detail below.'0 3
C. The FCPA in Practice: Broad Enforcement with Little Oversight
The increase in overall enforcement matters, especially with
regard to foreign entities and individuals, can be attributed in part to
the proliferation of NPAs and DPAs as well as the ambiguity of
language in the statute.104 Both factors have led to several interesting
consequences, including arbitrary enforcement of minute violations
and confusion about the exact scope of the Act.10 5
1. Increased NPA and DPA Enforcement
While the FCPA ostensibly limits enforcement to individuals or
entities whose illegal conduct has a sufficient nexus to the United
States, in practice the SEC and DOJ have pursued charges against
foreign nationals whose corrupt actions have had little connection to
the United States.106 The SEC and DOJ's use of NPAs and DPAs, as
opposed to litigation, in cases involving foreign national and entities is
largely responsible for this phenomenon.10 7 NPAs and DPAs allow the
DOJ and SEC to resolve disputes with litigants outside of court in
exchange for a less severe penalty against the charged corporation.
0 8
Those government agencies began using NPAs and DPAs in 2004 as an
alternative option to bringing charges against entities and
individuals.0 9 While the DOJ was incentivized to pursue this
alternative to litigation due to fears that the threat of litigation would
financially ruin corporations and subsequently lead to mass
102. Salbu, supra note 23, at 424-25 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2012)).
103. Id. at 425; infra Part III.D.1.A.
104. See Koehler, supra note 6, at 499 (stating that NPAs and DPAs produced a
higher quantity but lower quality of FCPA enforcement matters).
105. Willborn, supra note 20, at 438.
106. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 226 (noting that the DOJ and SEC have applied
the FCPA to foreign issuers even when the corrupt conduct in question "neither
originated nor was completed within U.S. territory").
107. See id. at 257 ("[M]ost FCPA matters are settled out of court by way of DPAs
or NPAs.").
108. See id. at 239 (noting that NPAs and DPAs typically involve paying fines,
corporate governance reforms, monitors, or other penalties).
109. Koehler, supra note 6, at 500.
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unemployment, the rise in NPAs and DPAs has produced several
unintended consequences.110
The use of NPAs and DPAs has resulted in more enforcement
matters against corporations, but it has also stunted the development
of case law pertaining to FCPA matters, as most cases fail to reach the
court system."' Because of the dearth of case law on the matter,
government agencies have to rely on the text of the statute and vague
guidelines to determine whether they can exercise jurisdiction over
foreign nationals and corporations.11 2 Consequently, the DOJ and SEC
have broadly interpreted the FCPA to bring enforcement actions
against entities and individuals whose illegal conduct had a tenuous
connection to the United States without much input from the judicial
system."3
This broad discretion to bring charges against individuals has
been extremely profitable for the United States, resulting in several
settlements that have nearly reached one billion dollars. 114 The United
States has profited so greatly because companies would
understandably rather settle with agencies outside of court than incur
large litigation costs and risk bad press and subsequent stock
devaluation."5 Moreover, the DOJ and SEC have celebrated the rise
in the number of enforcement actions as evidence of their success in
curbing the bribery of foreign officials.116 Nonetheless, this broad
interpretation of the Act's jurisdiction runs the risk of violating
principles of international law concerning sovereignty and poses a
threat to its reputation abroad."x7 There is also relatively little
evidence demonstrating that pursuing these cases under a broad
interpretation of the statute is particularly effective in deterring future
110. See id. at 502-03 (detailing the Thompson Memorandum's mandate and its
effects).
111. Id. at 505.
112. See Willborn, supra note 20, at 436 (noting that agencies typically use
settlement agreements rather than case law as guidance for their decisions).
113. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 254 (stating that there is often little connection
between the issue at hand and the United States).
114. See id. at 238 (listing several settlements with foreign companies that have
generated hundreds of millions of dollars for the United States).
115. Id. at 240; Lestelle, supra note 40, at 529.
116. See Koehler, supra note 6, at 512-13 (citing an interview with the Assistant
Attorney General in which he claimed that the high number of matters spawned by the
pursuit of NPAs and DPAs resulted in "greater accountability for corporate
wrongdoing").
117. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 226 ("[E]xtension of FCPA jurisdiction to
foreign non-issuers may constitute an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction contrary to
principles of international law."); Alan Cullison, Austrian Court Denies US Request o
Extradite Dmytro Firtash, WALL ST. J. (May 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/austrian-court-denies-u-s-request-to-extradite-dmytro-firtash-1430464915
[https://perma.cc/F8G8-AZXX] (archived Oct. 8, 2016) (describing a case where Austria
refused to extradite an individual who was charged under the FCPA because it thought
the United States' charges were politically motivated).
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crime.1 8 Despite these drawbacks, the DOJ continues to use its broad
discretion to implicate foreign corporations and individuals under the
FCPA primarily by forcing them to agree to NPAs and DPAs.11
9
2. Ambiguity in the Definitions of "Foreign Official" and "Giving Value"
The academic and legal communities have extensively criticized
the FCPA for failing to sufficiently define some of its key terms.
120 The
most common critiques are that it is unclear who constitutes a foreign
official and what qualifies as a "foreign official" for purposes of bribery
under the Act. 121 The statute defines a foreign official as "any officer or
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or
any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of [the
same]."1 22 However, numerous matters have demonstrated that the
DOJ and SEC have interpreted this particular definition very broadly,
which has resulted in unpredictable enforcement patterns.
2 3
Many companies have had trouble identifying which persons and
which activities fall under the broad categories of government
employees and instrumentalities thereof, neither of which is further
defined by the Act.124 In the House of Representatives' report for the
original statute, legislators expressly distinguished between payments
made to influence foreign governments' policy, and procedural
payments made to lower level bureaucrats; they proclaimed the latter
to be exempt from the purview of the Act.1
25 The Senate followed suit
by confirming this definition, thereby excluding routine payments to
foreign clerical employees from being prosecuted under the FCPA.1
26
118. See Mike Koehler, Do NPAs and DPAs Deter?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 12,
2013), http://fcpaprofessor.com/do-npas-and-dpas-deter/ [https://perma.cclS356-66T
3 ]
(archived Oct. 9, 2016) (citing several examples where corporations had committed FCPA
violations after previously entering into NPAs or DPAs for prior violations).
119. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 239 (noting that DPAs and NPAs were used to
resolve approximately seventy-seven percent of all FCPA related actions).
120. See Alexander G. Hughes, Drawing Sensible Borders for the Definition of
"Foreign Official" Under the FCPA, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 253, 256-57 (2013) (stating that
there is significant ambiguity as to who or what constitutes an instrumentality of a
foreign government).
121. Id. at 261.
122. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78(f)(1)(A) (2012)) (emphasis added).
123. Id. (recognizing the lack of clarity as to what qualifies an entity as an
instrumentality of a foreign government).
124. Id.; Feld, supra note 23, at 249-50.
125. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977) (recommending that "a payment ... made
to influence the passage of law, regulations, the placement of government contracts, the
formulation of policy or other discretionary governmental functions... would be
prohibited" whereas "payments made to secure permits, licenses, or the expeditious
performance of similar duties of an essentially ministerial or clerical nature" would not
be).
126. See Alexander L. Harisiadis, Foreign Official, Define Thyself: How to Define
Foreign Officials and Instrumentalities in the Face of Aggressive Enforcement of the
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But during the last couple of decades, the DOJ and SEC have
taken steps to broaden the meaning of both government employees and
instrumentalities without attempting to define their limits.12 7 This has
resulted in further confusion among companies charged under the
Act.' 28 One of the most common challenges raised by defendant-
corporations is that state-owned enterprises are not instrumentalities
of foreign governments constituting foreign officials under the
FCPA.129 During these investigations, the DOJ and SEC have insisted
that state-owned enterprises, including hospitals and utility
companies among other entities, do qualify as government
instrumentalities for purposes of the Act.130 Consequently, the
payment of foreign physicians and staff at state-owned hospitals in
exchange for business opportunities is technically a violation of the
Act.' 31 Further compounding the issue is the DOJ and SEC's failure to
specify the degree of state ownership that qualifies a state-owned
enterprise as an instrumentality.'3 2 The lack of judicial guidance has
helped affirm the DOJ and SEC's expansive view.1 33
Current guidelines issued by the DOJ and SEC are also unhelpful
in further defining the disputed terms.134 Requests have been made to
both agencies to clarify the terms so that corporations can adequately
comply with the Act's requirements.13 5 For instance, in 2012 the
Chamber of Commerce requested that the DOJ provide more
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 507, 530 (2013) ("The Senate's
acceptance of the House's foreign official definition supports the argument that Congress
intended a restrained definition.").
127. See id. at 533 (noting that the DOJ and SEC adopted a broader
interpretation of foreign officials and instrumentalities which contravened the Act's
legislative history).
128. See Katherine M. Morgan, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Toward A
Definition of "Foreign Official", 38 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 415, 437 (2012) (describing how the
minimal judicial review of the Act allows prosecutors nearly limitless discretion in
interpreting it).
129. See Hughes, supra note 120, at 262-68 (detailing cases under which the
interpretation of government instrumentality was challenged).
130. See Harisiadis, supra note 126, at 522-23 (referencing a specific case where
SEC charged a company with violating the FCPA for making payments to physicians
who worked at a Taiwanese state-owned hospital).
131. See id. (noting that in 2002 the SEC settled an FCPA enforcement
proceeding that involved bribes to foreign physicians employed by state-run medical
facilities).
132. See id. at 517 n.71 (citing an article that states while it is easy to determine
if a foreign government owns some percentage of a company, it is difficult to determine
if that government exercises enough control over the corporation in order for it to
constitute an instrumentality of a foreign government).
133. See Morgan, supra note 128, at 437 ("American courts have acknowledged
the undefined nature of 'foreign official' under the FCPA; however, they have only
provided limited assistance in remedying the issue.").
134. See Willborn, supra note 20, at 438 ("[U]nhelpful prosecutorial guidelines
has led to significant confusion about the parameters of the FCPA and its enforcement.").
135. See Hughes, supra note 120, at 273 (noting that guidelines supplementing
the Act were "hailed as a 'welcome clarification' by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce").
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information on who constitutes a foreign official to no avail.1
36 The DOJ
and SEC issued a joint FCPA Research Guide that merely reaffirmed
that any government employee is considered a foreign official for
purposes of the Act, and that a determination that a certain
instrumentality is covered depends on a fact-driven analysis of the
particular case.13 7 Combined with the few government-friendly
decisions concerning these definitions, these vague guidelines
encourage increased enforcement, which corresponds with further
increases in investigations.13 8
3. Consequences of Expansion to Foreign Entities and Individuals:
Arbitrary Enforcement and Higher Penalties
This increase in investigatory matters has disproportionately
impacted foreign entities that are charged under the Act because those
companies often pay larger fines than their US competitors.'
39 For
example, as of 2013, foreign cases were responsible for 67 percent of
the overall value of financial penalties despite constituting only 30
percent of the entities being investigated.140 Indeed, foreign companies
paid higher fines on average than their US counterparts.141 Moreover,
of the top ten highest settlements ever under the Act, seven have been
paid by non-US corporations and three by US companies.1
42 These
seven foreign companies have altogether paid close to $4.6 billion in
fees since 2008.143 This pattern of enforcement has not only impacted
foreign corporations, but has also unfairly targeted non-US citizens. Of
the eighteen individuals charged under the FCPA in 2011, twelve were
from outside of the United States.1
44
Given the potential complications that accompany extraterritorial
jurisdiction,14 5 it is peculiar that the DOJ and SEC's charges and
penalties have continued to disproportionately impact foreign
corporations and individuals. In one instance, a journalist speculates
that US agencies bring cases against foreign individuals because the
cases would be more difficult to defend based on said individuals'
136. Id. at 257.
137. Id.
138. See Morgan, supra note 128, at 437 (noting that the dearth of case law on
the FCPA has given "aggressive prosecutors" great discretion in interpreting the Act).
139. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 236 (explaining that foreign firms are paying
more than five times the FCPA fines paid by domestic firms).
140. Id. at 237.
141. See Willborn, supra note 20, at 430 n.52 (citing a statistic that said foreign
entities pay fines that are on average twenty-two times higher than those paid by US
corporations).
142. See Cassin, supra note 53 (listing the top ten highest value FCPA
enforcement actions of all time).
143. Id.
144. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 98, at 1-2.
145. See infra Part III.D.
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egregious behavior.146 The underlying actions of these cases began
decades ago, when foreign entities and individuals were not yet subject
to the FCPA's jurisdiction or even aware of its provisions, so they
unwittingly committed blatant offenses.1 47 Others posit that because
of the complications stemming from pursuing foreign corporations, the
DOJ and SEC only bring charges against the biggest firms from which
they can extract the largest penalties.14 8 Regardless of the reason, the
government's practice of targeting foreign firms, particularly those
who have virtually no connection to the United States, poses several
potential problems to the US economy and international reputation as
well as to the non-US entities who are arbitrarily subject to the Act.
D. Issues Facing Enforcement against Foreign Entities and
Individuals
The disproportionate impact on foreign companies and individuals
has produced many consequences for US and foreign interests alike,
including damage to diplomatic relations and unnecessary expenses to
government agencies.
1. Violations of International Norms of Sovereignty and Ineffective
International Enforcement
The seemingly endless expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction
under the FCPA has undoubtedly resulted in a significant increase in
enforcement actions and subsequent revenue stemming from large,
corporate settlements.149 Yet, it is important to consider what the
potential costs of this course of action are as well.
a. Anti-Bribery Cultural Norms and International Customary Law
Regarding Sovereignty
As illustrated by the OECD Convention, the elimination of
international corruption through anti-bribery legislation remains a
146. See Leslie Wayne, Foreign Firms Most Affected by a US Law Barring Bribes,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/business/global/bribery-
settlements-under-us-law-are-mostly-with-foreign-countries.htm
[https://perma.cclV7DS-3Q4J] (archived Sept. 19, 2017) (stating that the DOJ pursued
cases because they involved behavior that clearly violated the FCPA).
147. Id.
148. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV.
1775, 1780 (2011) ("One would expect prosecutors to pursue only more substantial
foreign firms and only in more serious cases, given the practical obstacles to
investigating foreign violations.").
149. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 236-38 (noting that data shows a clear
discrepancy in the amount of fines paid by foreign versus domestic firms).
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universal value.1 50 However, what constitutes the bribery of foreign
officials is a cultural construct varying from country to country.
151
Therefore, a defendant's "offense" as defined by US law may not even
qualify as bribery in that individual's home country.1
52 This issue
presents problems of notice to the individual who is being charged with
the crime as well as potential violations of norms of international
sovereignty.153
The affirmative defense as defined by § 78dd-3(c)(1) of the FCPA
could mitigate the problem posed by accepting diverse understandings
of bribery.154 Under this provision, actions that would ordinarily
violate US law, but are expressly legal according to written statutes of
the country in which the offense takes place, are not subject to the
FCPA's jurisdiction.15 5 However, this position ignores the fact that
most legal actions are not expressly designated legal by statute but are
presumed to be legal until stated otherwise.1
56 Furthermore, even if
certain acts are designated as legal in a given country, US officials will
need to read and accurately translate these pieces of legislation to
determine what actions are necessarily lawful.
1 57 Statutory
interpretation is difficult in one's native language, and the risk of
misinterpreting these laws is even higher with the added complexity
of reading them in another language.
5 8 For those reasons, many
actions that are presumably legal in the venue country will still be
subject to the strict constraints of the FCPA because they are not
explicitly stated as legal.'
59
Overreaching legislation that ignores these cultural differences
can at best decrease the level of comity between individual countries,
and at worst constitute a violation of norms of sovereignty.
60 Current
enforcement actions under the FCPA rarely consider international
150. See Salbu, supra note 23, at 423-24 (citing to universal condemnation of
bribery).
151. See id. at 424 ("[C]ondemnation of certain behaviors may vary in degree-
some cultures may not censure bribery to the extent others do.").
152. See id. ("[C]ountries in a highly pluralistic world are unlikely to agree about
which reciprocities are acceptable and which are not.").
153. See id. at 426 (stating that determining what conduct is punishable by law
in several different legal systems is difficult).
154. See id. at 425 (introducing the affirmative defense that allows a target of an
investigation to avoid charges if her actions are not illegal in her country).
155. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2012)).
156. See id. at 426-27 (describing the challenges of linguistic and cultural
translation).
157. See id. at 426 (noting that the translation process is "fraught with occasions
for both the exercise of judgment and the commission of error").
158. See id. at 427 (noting the challenges with interpretation).
159. See id. (recognizing that law enforcement officials would need to understand
the scope of an express legislative proscription to determine exactly what acts are
lawful).
160. Id.; see Willborn, supra note 20, at 423-24 ('This application of the FCPA
leads to difficulties normally associated with extraterritorial application of U.S. law such
as comity, conflict with foreign law, and diplomatic issues.").
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norms of sovereignty.'61 While it has no official universal definition,
the concept of sovereignty usually involves "the recognition of a
government's right to exercise exclusive control" over its own state.162
It is also widely recognized that the concept of sovereignty is crucial to
the current system of international relations.163 Thus, US agencies'
current expansive exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the
FCPA violates norms of international sovereignty by impeding a
foreign government's ability to maintain control over its citizens and
prosecute them for conduct that the foreign government, not the
United States, designates a crime. This long-arm exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction could ultimately undermine US goals by
negatively impacting the relationship of the United States with
officials in allied countries who feel that US prosecutors have violated
their right to self-govern.164 Consequently, those countries may decline
to cooperate in any anti-bribery investigations.165
b. Unequal Global Enforcement of Foreign Bribery
Stronger enforcement against foreign entities and individuals not
only damages the reputation of the United States in the international
community, but it could also undermine US corporate and political
interests by discouraging other countries from enforcing their own
anti-bribery laws. As stated earlier, many other countries have enacted
their own anti-bribery laws but have not been as diligent about
enforcing these laws.'6 6 The NYC Bar Committee speculates that this
low level of enforcement by other countries is caused by over-regulation
by US authorities.16 7
The NYC Bar Committee illustrates this point by describing the
incentives to enforce anti-bribery legislation through a prisoner's
dilemma analysis.168 In this analysis, countries that zealously enforce
their anti-bribery legislation are known as enforcers and those that
161. Willborn, supra note 20, at 423-24.
162. Gary D. Brown, The Fourteenth Annual Sommerfeld Lecture: the Wrong
Questions About Cyberspace, 217 ML. L. REV. 214, 225 (2013).
163. ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1435 (John P. Grant
& J. Craig Barker eds., 3d ed. 2009).
164. See Willborn, supra note 20, at 445-46 (suggesting that US agencies adopt
extraterritorial standards set by antitrust practices in order to avoid the notion that they
are prosecuting foreign companies for ulterior motives).
165. See id. at 446-48 (detailing the benefits of international cooperation in
prosecuting foreign bribery).
166. See N.Y.C. BAR ASS'N, supra note 68, at 12 (noting that "from 2000 to 2010
U.S. authorities brought more than 3.5 times more foreign bribery enforcement actions
than all other countries combined").
167. See id. at 15-16 ("[I]f multiple countries 'agree' to craft and enforce anti-
corruption statutes and some countries make it clear that they will enforce the laws
zealously ('the enforcers'), there are significant incentives for other countries (the 'non-
enforcers') not to implement or not to enforce their anti-corruption laws.").
168. Id.
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enforce their laws at lower levels are known as non-enforcers.
169 The
NYC Bar Committee states that companies in non-enforcer
jurisdictions are more likely to secure business in countries where
bribery is common because they are inherently less likely to face
prosecution for their offenses in their home countries.
170 Pursuing that
business makes the companies of non-enforcer jurisdictions more
globally competitive compared with their counterparts in enforcer
countries.171 Because countries are likely to advocate for policies that
benefit their national entities, countries may accordingly be less
inclined to enforce their anti-bribery legislation when US agencies
zealously enforce the FCPA.17 2
Unequal enforcement of anti-bribery legislation worldwide could
yield undesirable consequences to US corporate and political interests.
As stated previously, this inequity could lead corporations in non-
enforcer states to have a competitive advantage over their counterparts
in enforcer states.17 3 Consequently, US companies-which are
undeniably subject to the zealous enforcement of the FCPA-can
actually incur significant disadvantages in the global market even if
US agencies pursue foreign entities and individuals.'7 4 Furthermore,
as discussed further below, FCPA investigations require significant
transaction costs, the bulk of which US agencies could bear if they
continue to discourage other countries from prosecuting corruption by
zealously enforcing the FCPA.175 Consequently, US interests may fare
better if US agencies limit the FCPA's jurisdiction over foreign entities
and individuals and instead encourage other nations to further enforce
their anti-bribery legislation against their own citizens.
2. Practical Costs to US Interests
Although non-US entities and individuals on average pay much
larger settlement amounts than those residing in the United States,
176
the SEC and DOJ face significant operational difficulties during
169. Id.
170. See id. (noting that companies in jurisdictions that enforce anti-corruption
legislation at lower levels are less likely to be prosecuted for engaging in bribery in which
no anti-bribery legislation has been enacted).
171. See id. (stating that companies can use "[t]he additional profits made, costs
saved, knowledge gained and relationships" made through their new business to gain a
competitive advantage).
172. See id. ("[Bly 'dialing back' enforcement or having a 'lighter-touch' a country
can provide a substantial advantage to its domestic enterprises.").
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing evidentiary challenges and fees affiliated
with FCPA investigations).
176. See Willborn, supra note 20, at 430 n.52 (citing statistic that shows foreign
entities pay fines that are on average twenty-two times higher than those paid by US
corporations).
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investigations of foreign firms.177 Whenever the DOJ or SEC
commences an investigation of a foreign entity or individual, its officers
face a barrage of institutional challenges to gathering evidence and
witness testimony from other countries.1 78 Because the majority of
evidence that is necessary to pursue a case against a foreign entity
resides in that corporation's host country, the DOJ and SEC have to
either rely on the company itself to voluntarily provide that
information or request it from the firm's home government.17 9
The DOJ and SEC have separate channels through which they can
obtain discovery from foreign governments. Because the DOJ focuses
more on criminal matters, it must rely on US Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties (MLAT) with other nations in order to procure the necessary
information.8 0 Under an MLAT, any nation that is party to the treaty
is obligated to assist other signatories with their criminal
investigations and cases.18 1 As a result, if the United States has an
MLAT with a given country, the DOJ can invoke the treaty to request
information from that country that is pertinent to any criminal
prosecution.
The SEC primarily utilizes its Office of International Affairs (OIA)
to submit a formal request to the opposing party's government.182
OIA's goal is to enhance cooperation among different nations to ensure
effective cross-border regulatory compliance with securities law.'83 By
specializing in the laws of other foreign countries, OIA can more
quickly navigate other countries' different procedures regarding
discovery requests and can more efficiently retrieve the relevant
information than the SEC.184
Even though these mechanisms by which the DOJ and SEC can
obtain discovery for their investigations are generally helpful, the need
177. See Hecker & Laporte, supra note 51 ("[T]he process [of obtaining assistance
from foreign authorities] can be lengthy, not all foreign authorities are willing to
cooperate, and the resulting delays may implicate the U.S. statute of limitations for
FCPA violations.").
178. See E.C. Lashbrooke Jr., The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: A
Unilateral Solution to an International Problem, 12 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 227, 236-38
(1979) (describing how obtaining evidence in FCPA cases, particularly when it is located
in a foreign jurisdiction, poses challenges for US authorities).
179. See Hecker & Laporte, supra note 51 (explaining requests of foreign
evidence).
180. See id. ("MLATs are intended to 'modernize law enforcement and judicial
cooperation."').
181. Frequently Asked Questions, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES,
https://mlat.info/faq (last visited Jan. 19, 2017) [https://perma.cclPXF2-JV5Y] (archived
Jan. 19, 2017).
182. See Hecker & Laporte, supra note 51 (noting that the SEC can also obtain
evidence by having the DOJ invoke an MLAT or send formal letters rogatory).
183. Office of International Affairs, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
https://www.sec.gov/oia/Article/about.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2017)
[https://perma.cclSP4U-Q4UX] (archived Jan. 19, 2017).
184. Id.
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to obtain evidence still presents a host of problems. The United States
does not have a strong MLAT with every country, which means that
some foreign officials can reject a discovery request for a particular
case notwithstanding the fact that the charged corporation is within
the FCPA's jurisdiction.185 Furthermore, even if the United States has
a strong MLAT with the corporation's host country, generally there are
major discrepancies in procedure and data privacy regulations between
the United States and other nations.'
8 6 In cases where cooperation is
difficult to obtain due to these discrepancies, federal prosecutors at the
DOJ may face significant delays and expend exorbitant resources to
obtain crucial information to support their cases.
1 87 These delays could
result in stale and potentially inaccurate information as it pertains to
events that are far removed in time.'8 8 Officers at the SEC may face
similar costs in attempting to procure necessary discovery despite the
existence of the OIA.189 Therefore, the prosecution of foreign entities
and individuals, albeit profitable in some cases, may not always be
worth the practical costs of obtaining discovery for certain
investigations.
E. Using Diplomacy and International Treaties to Achieve Universal
Goals
In cases where jurisdiction over foreign entities is an issue for US
law enforcement, politicians and bureaucrats have used a variety of
tactics to influence other nations and the international system to
implement policies that promote US interests. One strategy is the use
of public diplomacy, which is most commonly utilized by the State
Department and other executive officials. Another is the invocation of
international treaties, such as the OECD Convention.
1. Public Diplomacy Efforts by Politicians and Bureaucratic Agencies
to Realize Global Objectives
Scholars define "public diplomacy" as "the set of practices and
actions by which a state seeks to inform and influence citizens of
foreign countries in ways that promote its national interest."
190
185. See Hecker & Laporte, supra note 51 (commenting that U.S. authorities face
significant challenges when requesting evidence from a country with which the United
States does not have a strong MLAT).
186. See id. (recognizing the existence of procedural delays).
187. See id. ("Not only can these procedural challenges result in significant
delays, but these delays often give rise to claims that the five year statute of limitations
for FCPA violations has expired.").
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Katherine Brown & Tom Glaisyer, Strengthening US Statecraft Through
Public Diplomacy, 35 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 47, 47 (2011).
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Heavily utilized by the Obama administration, this strategy is used to
pressure foreign governments to adopt policies that coincide with US
interests by directly connecting with and influencing these states'
citizens.1 9 1 To do so, US officials advocate for certain policies through
globally broadcast speeches and media campaigns.192 They also
research the attitudes and cultures of foreign publics and carefully
craft these messages to ensure that they appeal to target citizens and
foster trust with the United States.193 The citizens, as constituents,
pressure their governments to adopt changes that conform to US
policies, which allows the United States to achieve its interests on an
international level without directly confronting foreign state
officials. 194
Bureaucratic officials, particularly those who work in the US
State Department, are prone to using this tactic.1 9 5 This is not
surprising given the State Department's mission is nearly identical to
that of public diplomacy.196 The State Department's efforts to promote
US policies on a global level extend to issues impacting businesses. The
State Department's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
advocates other companies adopt policies that align with US interests
in a variety of areas, including intellectual property, trade, and
transportation.19 7 Most notably, its Investment Finance and
Development subdivision is responsible for promoting investment
policies that benefit US interests, including anti-corruption reforms,
on a global scale.'9 8 Therefore, the State Department has the capacity
to publicly spread US interests with regard to anti-corruption without
resorting to legal recourse that may violate norms of sovereignty.
191. See Bruce Gregory, American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics,
Elusive Transformation, 6 HAGUE J. DIPL. 351, 353 (2011) (defining public diplomacy "as
a state-based instrument used by foreign ministries and other government agencies to
engage and persuade foreign publics for the purpose of influencing their governments").
192. See id. at 361 (citing methods of advocacy that are used to influence the
public).
193. Id. at 355; see Defining Public Diplomacy, UNIV. SOUTHERN CAL. CTR. ON
PUB. DIPL., http://usepubliediplomacy.org/page/what-pd (last visited Mar. 14, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/397J-W55S] (archived Mar. 1, 2017) (defining public diplomacy as a
"mechanism through which nations foster mutual trust and productive relationships").
194. See Brown & Glaisyer, supra note 190, at 53 (describing President Obama's
efforts to influence Egyptian citizens to pursue democracy during the Arab Spring).
195. See Gregory, supra note 191, at 364-65 (noting that employees in nearly
every level of the bureaucratic hierarchy engage in public diplomacy).
196. See Department Mission Statement, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/index.htm#mission (last visited Mar. 1, 2017)
[https://perma.cclT5S6-325S] (archived Mar. 1, 2017).
197. Bureau of Economics and Business Affairs, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4YK5-
TLZG] (archived Mar. 1, 2017).
198. Id.
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2. OECD Convention Mandates and Ways to Ensure Compliance
Similarly, US officials could further invoke the obligations of
binding treaties to compel foreign states to comply with policies that
are in the interests of the United States. Given that the OECD
Convention was drafted with the purpose of encouraging states to
adopt anti-bribery legislation that is similar to the FCPA,
199 US
officials could use this treaty to influence other nations to combat the
bribery of foreign officials.
The OECD Convention mandates that each of its thirty-four
member states "take such measures as may be necessary to establish
that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally
to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary . . . to a foreign
official . . . in order to obtain or retain business."
200 Thus, it obligates
each member state to not only enact legislation that criminalizes the
act of bribing foreign officials, but to also adequately enforce these laws
and assist other parties with their own anti-corruption
investigations.201 Reassured by this provision, the Senate ratified this
treaty with the explicit goal of ensuring that signatory states
criminalized the offense of bribing foreign officials so that US
businesses did not succumb to a global competitive disadvantage.
202
Much to their delight, each signatory enacted legislation that expressly
prohibited this act.
203
Nevertheless, the OECD is broad enough to allow each member
state to develop an anti-corruption plan that is well-adapted to their
current legal system and culture.2 04 This idea is further bolstered by
the preamble and commentaries on the treaty, which both embrace the
"functional equivalence" principle that allows countries to use multiple
approaches to achieve the ultimate goal of criminalizing bribery of
foreign officials.2 0 5 Because member states have the flexibility to
design their own anti-bribery regime within the broad constraints of
199. See Feld, supra note 23, at 256 (stating that the OECD Convention's purpose
was to "level the playing field" by requiring parties to adopt effective anti-bribery
legislation).
200. See id. at 269 n.192 (quoting OECD Convention).
201. Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaty Double Jeopardy: The OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention and the FCPA, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1321, 1327 (2012) (citing a Senate Executive
Committee report that highlighted the OECD's requirement that member states adopt
and enforce their anti-bribery legislation).
202. Id.
203. See id. ("Between 1999 and early 2004, all OECD member states
criminalized in their domestic law the specific crimes of 'bribery of a foreign public
official' defined in Article 1 of the Convention.").
204. See Andrew Tyler, Enforcing Enforcement: Is the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention's Peer Review Effective?, 43 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 137, 147 (2011) ("The
purpose of [the OECD's] open-ended articles is to allow for the harmonization of
Convention rules across legal systems that have vast divergences with respect to
domestic procedures, jurisdiction, liability, and rules of evidence.").
205. Id.
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the OECD Convention, components of each nation's system and its
enforcement can vary widely.206
Despite this fact, member states can ensure compliance with the
OECD Convention's overall goals through the treaty's peer review
mechanism.207 This system is comprised of representatives from
member states who attempt to ensure general uniformity in
enforcement by monitoring and reviewing the other states' efforts to
adhere to the treaty.208 After these representatives complete their
reviews, the OECD's Working Group on Bribery in International
Business Transactions compiles their statements and produces a
report and publishes it online.209 Consequently, all signatory states,
including the United States, can easily monitor and single out other
members who are not adequately enforcing their laws against
corporate corruption.
IV. SOLUTION
A. Limit § 78dd-3 to Foreign Entities and Individuals Acting within
US Borders
As mentioned above, the recent aggressive enforcement of the
FCPA against foreign businesses and individuals has raised alarms
among policy experts concerning potential violations of sovereignty
and costs to US agencies.210 This issue particularly impacts foreign
entities whose illicit activities have tenuous connections to the United
States under § 78dd-3.21 1 To effectively resolve this issue, future
administrations should ensure that the DOJ and SEC reign in the
historically broad interpretation of extraterritorial jurisdiction under
this provision by issuing new guidelines.2 12 These guidelines should
206. Id.
207. See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Convention
on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions art. 1, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, art. 12 ("The Parties shall co-operate in
carrying out a programme of systematic follow-up to monitor and promote the full
implementation of this Convention.").
208. See Tyler, supra note 204, at 149 ("The Convention's success requires
uniform and fair application to level the playing field and to prevent any nonconforming
party from gaining a competitive advantage over conforming parties in securing business
through bribery.").
209. See id. ("At the end of the monitoring process the WGB publishes its country
monitoring reports online.").
210. Supra Part III.D.
211. Supra Part III.C.3.
212. Future administrations could also consider several alternative solutions,
but they are less desirable than the proposed solution. One way to resolve this issue is
to revert back to the original text of the statute and fully eliminate jurisdiction over
foreign entities and individuals. This solution is not ideal because it would undermine
global anti-bribery efforts and result in a competitive disadvantage to U.S. companies.
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direct agency officers to interpret § 73dd-3 literally so that they are
limited to prosecuting foreign entities and individuals under the
concept of territorial jurisdiction.2 13
Under the proposed solution, the DOJ and SEC would direct their
officers to limit their exercise of jurisdiction under § 73dd-3 to foreign
entities and individuals who commit offenses while within the physical
territory of the United States.214 As discussed previously, foreign
entities and individuals have a difficult time determining if they have
violated the FCPA, especially when their conduct would be considered
acceptable in their own countries.2 15 At a minimum, this raises issues
of notice for foreign individuals who are unable to anticipate
enforcement actions and modify their behavior.
2 16 It can also risk
violations of the norms of comity and sovereignty by demonstrating
that US agencies have little respect for other countries' cultural
differences and sovereignty.217 Limiting the DOJ and SEC's reach to
pure territorial jurisdiction ensures a bright-line rule that makes it
easier for potential defendants to know that they are subject to the
FCPA by virtue of being in the United States and that they must
comply with the Act's provisions.
Similarly, the limitation on the DOJ and SEC's jurisdiction under
a plain reading of § 78dd-3 strikes an ideal balance of maintaining the
reputation of the United States in the international community and
ensuring its companies' competitive advantage abroad. The American
judiciary has typically respected other states' sovereignty by limiting
the reach of its jurisdiction under norms of international comity.
218
Consequently, this solution would allow the DOJ and SEC to uphold
respect for state sovereignty by pursuing cases with foreign actors that
are geographically tied to the United States rather than ones whose
communications merely pass through its borders. Moreover, this
Another idea would be to reduce overall enforcement of the FCPA. However, this plan
will likely lead to an increase in the bribery of foreign officials abroad, as it will effectively
eliminate the most successful anti-bribery legislation. Finally, future administrations
could continue enforcing the FCPA as past administrations have, but that alone would
not eliminate any of the modern criticisms of those practices.
213. Territorial jurisdiction is consistent with a plain meaning interpretation of
§ 73dd-3 as both grant agencies the authority to exercise jurisdiction over entities and
individuals who act within the borders of the United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3
(2012) (prohibiting "any person" from bribing foreign officials "while in the territory of
the United States"); Territorial Jurisdiction, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defining territorial jurisdiction as "[]urisdiction over cases arising in arising in or
involving persons residing within a defined territory").
214. Territorial Jurisdiction, supra note 213.
215. Supra Parts III.C.3, III.D.1.a.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 2071, 2072 (2015) (explaining that "[t]he doctrines of American law that mediate
the relationship between the U.S. legal system and those of other nations are nearly all
manifestations of international comity").
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solution will not substantially disadvantage US companies because
foreign companies whose actions have a sufficient nexus to the United
States-such as those who commit offenses while in the United
States-will still be prosecuted under these federal agencies'
jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding these benefits, this solution still has its
shortcomings as it barely addresses certain issues discussed in this
Note, such as the expenses of obtaining discovery abroad.21 9 However,
implementing this solution would, at a minimum, reduce the overall
number of foreign investigations, thereby mitigating the expense of
discovery. Therefore, as a whole, this solution provides adequate notice
to potential targets of investigations and fulfills the FCPA's original
goal of bolstering the United States' reputation and § 78dd-3's objective
of boosting its corporate dominance abroad.
B. Utilize Diplomacy to Increase Prosecution in Other Countries
The aforementioned solution is not complete, as it does not
address the issue of corporate corruption among actors whose actions
do not have a sufficient nexus to the United States. Because other
countries have not enforced anti-bribery legislation as diligently as the
United States,220 limiting the FCPA's jurisdiction may ultimately
undermine the OECD Convention's goal of reducing global corporate
corruption. To address that concern, US officials, such as President
Trump and his surrogates at the State Department, should engage in
public diplomacy and promote the OECD Convention to encourage
other states to combat the bribery of foreign officials.
1. Executive Branch Plan to Encourage Compliance
President Trump and his State Department have a powerful
mechanism in public diplomacy to influence other countries' policies in
the interests of the United States. Unlike current enforcement
practices of the FCPA, which undermine a foreign sovereign's ability
to define and prosecute its own corporate corruption crimes, public
diplomacy bypasses government-to-government interactions
altogether by allowing the president to directly influence foreign
constituencies instead.
Rather than risk the chance of offending foreign governments by
prosecuting their constituents with little cause, President Trump could
delegate to bureaucrats the task of researching foreign citizens'
219. Supra Part III.D.2.
220. See N.Y.C. BAR AS'N, supra note 68, at 12 (noting that "while the U.S.
brought 67 prosecutions under the FCPA in 2006-07, fifteen countries, 'including
Australia, Mexico, New Zealand, and Portugal,' brought none," and Canada and Japan
only brought one each).
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attitudes toward this issue. Subsequently, he could craft speeches,
global media campaigns, or even tweets condemning corporate
corruption that would resonate with the international community.
These foreign constituencies, in turn, may pressure their governments
to enforce laws against corporate corruption. The State Department's
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs would be an excellent office
to undertake this task as it is already involved in influencing anti-
corruption efforts abroad.
2. Invoke the OECD Convention to Boost Compliance
President Trump could use the OECD Convention to further assist
with these efforts. The OECD was devised to realize the goal of
eliminating global corporate corruption, and consequently imposes
binding obligations on all signatory states to enact and enforce
legislation that criminalizes the bribery of foreign officials.221 However,
due to the lack of an overarching international system, enforcement
must be achieved by states imposing reputational sanctions with the
help of the peer review system.22 2 By using its peer review system to
identify any members who have not been adhering to their obligations,
President Trump can tailor his public diplomacy efforts to those
countries' constituencies. His attempts will hopefully induce these
constituents to lobby their public officials to abide by their obligations
in the treaty and consequently result in higher enforcement within
their own sovereign territories.
Some may argue that this strategy would result in a menial
increase in enforcement at best because it only targets countries that,
by virtue of being signatories to the treaty, are already likely to
prosecute these crimes. In other words, it would not target the
countries who are not members of the OECD Convention where
enforcement is most lacking. Nonetheless, broader efforts at public
diplomacy should include those countries and hopefully propel their
citizens to lobby their governments for legislation that criminalizes
bribery of foreign officials. Combining public diplomacy and the OECD
Convention with an effort to eliminate jurisdiction over foreign
countries whose actions have an insufficient connection to the United
States should be the future enforcement strategy of the FCPA.
V. CONCLUSION
Enacted by Congress in the 1970s to combat the bribery of foreign
officials, the FCPA is a meaningful piece of legislation that has
221. See Tyler, supra note 204, at 149 (discussing the purpose of the OECD).
222. See id. at 148 (discussing reputational sanctions through a monitoring
system).
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effectively reduced corporate corruption on a global scale. However, the
statute's vague language and its minimal judicial oversight have
enabled the DOJ and SEC to overextend their jurisdictional reach. This
has resulted in an astronomical increase in enforcement matters
overall. More alarmingly, it has prompted an increase in investigations
of foreign actors whose alleged offenses have virtually no connection to
the United States.
Not only does an increase in enforcement against these foreign
entities and individuals risk undermining the reputation of the United
States by infringing on other nations' sovereignty, it also presents
enormous costs for agencies who pursue these actions. Moreover, the
ability to enforce the FCPA against these actors with virtually no
connections to the United States makes it more difficult for foreign
corporations to anticipate investigations and adequately protect
against them. Despite this consequence, US agencies have continued
to pursue investigations against foreign companies because they tend
to yield higher fines and arguably reduce global corporate corruption.
With a new administration in the White House, the United States
has an opportunity to change this troublesome pattern of enforcement.
US agencies should interpret § 78dd-3 literally to limit their
jurisdiction over foreign entities and individuals to those whose
wrongful acts occur within the United States. To further reduce global
corporate corruption by accounting for those actors acting completely
outside of the United States, President Trump and his officials at the
State Department should engage in public diplomacy and invoke the
OECD Convention to influence constituents of other nations. In turn,
those constituents will pressure their governments to enforce their own
anti-bribery legislation. This strategy will serve the FCPA's dual aims
of maintaining the positive image of the United States in the global
community and ensuring US corporations maintain a competitive
international advantage.
Sarah Routh*
Candidate for Doctor of Jurisprudence, 2018, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A.
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA. I would like to thank my friends, family,
and the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law staff for their assistance and
encouragement hroughout this process.
2018] 657

